We relate tax evasion behaviour to a substantial literature on self and social comparison in judgements. Taxpayers engage in tax evasion as way to potentially boost their consumption relative to others in their "local"social network, and relative to past consumption. The unique Nash equilibrium of the model relates optimal evasion to a (Bonacich) measure of network centrality: more central taxpayers evade more. The direct and indirect revenue e¤ects from auditing are shown to be ranked by a related Bonacich centrality. We generate networks corresponding closely to the observed structure of social networks observed empirically. In particular, our networks contain celebrity taxpayers, whose consumption is widely observed, and who are systematically of higher wealth. If the tax authority can (partially) observe the social network, we show that of the plethora of measures of centrality a tax authority might compute, the measure most correlated with evasion and direct/indirect e¤ects is a taxpayer's in-degree centrality.
Introduction
Estimates provided by the UK tax authority put the value of the tax gap -the di¤erence between the theoretical tax liability and the amount of tax paid -at 6.5% (H.M. Revenue and Customs, 2016) . Academic studies for the US and Europe put the gap substantially higher, at around 18-20% (Cebula and Feige, 2012; Buehn and Schneider, 2016) .
In this paper we link evasion behavior to a mass of evidence that people continually engage in comparisons -with others (social comparison) and with themselves in the recent past (self comparison -or "habit"). Utility, evidence for developed economies suggests, is in large part derived from consumption relative to these comparators, rather than from its absolute level (e.g., Ferrer-i-Carbonell, 2005; Luttmer, 2005; Clark and Senik, 2010; Mujcic and Frijters, 2013) . The evolutionary processes that might explain this phenomenon are explored in Postlewaite (1998) , Rayo and Becker (2007) and Samuelson (2004) , among others. Researchers have proposed that self and social comparison can explain economic phenomena including the Easterlin paradox (Clark et al., 2008; Rablen, 2008) , the equity-premium puzzle (Constantinides, 1990; Galí, 1994) ; stable labor supply in the face of rising incomes (Neumark and Postlewaite, 1998) ; upward rather than downward sloping wage pro…les (Loewenstein and Sicherman, 1991; Frank and Hutchens, 1993) ; the feeling of poverty (Sen, 1983) ; the demand for risky activities (Becker et al., 2005) ; and migration choices (Stark and Taylor, 1991) . There are important consequences for consumption and saving behavior (Dybvig, 1995; Chapman, 1998; Carroll et al., 2000) , for the desirability of economic growth (Layard, 1980 (Layard, , 2005 , for monetary policy (Fuhrer, 2000) , and for tax policy (Boskin and Sheshinki, 1978; Ljungqvist and Uhlig 2000; Koehne and Kuhn, 2015) .
Despite the overwhelming evidence of a concern for self and social comparison, these features have yet to be simultaneously explored in the context of the tax evasion decision. In this paper we provide a network model of the tax evasion decision in which taxpayers are assumed to have an intrinsic concern for income relative to a benchmark that can re ‡ect both self and social comparison. 1 Taxpayers in our model observe the consumption of a subset of other taxpayers (the "reference group") with whom they are linked on a social network. In this context, taxpayers may seek to evade tax so as to improve their standing relative to those they compare against. Taxpayers also benchmark their current consumption in part against its lagged values. The model exhibits strategic complementaries in evasion choices, so that more evasion by one taxpayer reinforces other taxpayers'decisions to evade also. Following the lead of Ballester et al. (2006) , we utilize linear-quadratic utility functions to provide a characterization of Nash equilibrium. We show that there is a unique Nash equilibrium in which evasion is a weighted network centrality measure of the form proposed by Bonacich (1987) . Network centrality is a concept developed in sociology to quantify the in ‡uence or power of actors in a network. It counts the number of all paths (not just shortest paths) that emanate from a given node, weighted by a decay factor that decreases with the length of these paths. In this sense, our contribution combines sociological and economic insights in seeking to understand tax evasion behavior.
Although the model is simple enough to admit an analytic solution, it is also su¢ ciently rich that it may be used to address a range of questions of interest to academics and practitioners in tax authorities. Here we focus on three such questions: …rst, we investigate how changes in the exogenous parameters a¤ect evasion; second, we explore how the marginal revenue e¤ects that arise from performing one extra audit vary across taxpayers with di¤erent levels of network centrality; and last we consider the dynamic pro…le of behavioral responses to an audit.
An important feature of our model is that it addresses explicitly the role of local comparisons on a social network. By contrast, the existing analytical literature on tax evasion allows only global (aggregate) social information to enter preferences: the global statistic that taxpayers are assumed to both have a concern for, and to be able to observe, is modelled as either (i) the proportion of taxpayers who report honestly (Gordon, 1989; Myles and Naylor, 1996; Davis et al., 2003; Kim, 2003; Traxler, 2010) ; (ii) the average post-tax consumption level (Goerke, 2013) ; (iii) the level of evasion as a share of GDP (Dell'Anno, 2009); or (iii) the average tax payment (Mittone and Patelli, 2000; Panadés, 2004) .
While reducing social information to a single statistic known to all taxpayers has a bene…t in terms of analytical tractability, it is problematic in a number of respects. First, from the perspective of modelling with explicit social networks, assuming that taxpayer's observe aggregate-level information is implicitly the assumption that every taxpayer observes the consumption of every other taxpayer. As we adopt the convention that a link from i to j signi…es that i can observe j's consumtion, full observability is equivalent to the assumption that the social network is the complete network (in which every taxpayer is directly linked to all other taxpayers). Yet there are reasons to think that relative consumption externalities are, in fact, heterogeneous across individuals. In particular, we know that people's reference group is typically composed of "local"comparators such as neighbors, colleagues, and friends (Luttmer, 2005; Clark and Senik, 2010) . 2 Moreover, implicitly assuming a complete network implies that all taxpayers are equally connected socially, thereby ruling out, in particular, the existence of "stars" or "celebrities" whose consumption is very widely observed in the network. Yet, such features of social networks may matter for the targeting of tax audits (Andrei et al., 2014) .
The only literature that has enriched the introduction of social information is that which uses agent-based simulation techniques as an alternative to analytical methods. Even here, however, representations of social networks appear to di¤er markedly from real world examples. A common property of the network structures employed (e.g., Korobow et al., 2007; Hokamp and Pickhardt, 2010; Bloomquist, 2011; Hokamp, 2014) is that the number of taxpayers who observe the consumption of each taxpayer is …xed, thereby ruling out the existence of highly observed celebrity taxpayers. Other authors (e.g., Davis et al. 2003; Hashimzade et al., 2014 Hashimzade et al., , 2016 utilize an undirected network, meaning that, if i is linked to j, then necessarily j is linked to i. Yet social networks display marked asymmetry in the direction of links (Foster et al., 2010; Szell and Thurner, 2010) . Social networks also exhibit a form of assortative matching, known as homophily, which too is not captured by existing work. We o¤er a model that is both analytically tractable and that allows for local comparisons on an arbitrary social network. In this sense, our approach lies in the cleavage between existing analytical and agent-based approaches, and is complementary to each. 3 Where we perform simulation analysis, we do so on a class of generative networks that are not subject to the restrictions discussed above, and which are widely utilized to model network structures in the natural sciences. Our methodology in this regard, therefore, has applicability beyond the current context of tax evasion.
To our knowledge, no previous contribution has allowed simultaneously for both self and social comparison in the tax evasion decision. Goerke (2013) , however, assumes an explicit (intrinsic) concern for relative consumption by taxpayers. The primary focus of his contribution is, however, the derived impact on tax evasion from endogenous changes in labor supply, whereas we treat income as an exogenous parameter. In the remaining literature that considers a social dimension to the tax evasion decision, taxpayers are assumed to derive utility solely from absolute consumption, but nonetheless react to social information because they experience social stigma -the extent of which depends on the evasion of other taxpayersif revealed to be evading. 4 The focus of much of this literature is on the potential for multiple equilibria, whereas our model yields a unique equilibrium. While a concern for relative consumption is compatible with the simultaneous existence of social stigma towards evaders, the two approaches di¤er in emphasis. Underlying the idea of social stigma is the concept of social conformity, in which agents seek to belong to the crowd, whereas the presumption of relative consumption theories is that individuals seek to stand out from the crowd. A small literature relating to this point in the context of tax evasion supports the notion that social information impacts compliance behavior (Alm et al., 2017; Alm and Yunus, 2009 ), but rejects social conformity as the underlying mechanism (Fortin et al., 2007) .
A recent contribution that allows explicitly for self comparison in the tax evasion decision is Bernasconi et al. (2016) . There are, however, important di¤erences in approach and results. In our model taxpayers are myopic, and habit re ‡ects only recent consumption outcomes, whereas these authors consider far-sighted taxpayers and habit re ‡ects the whole history of consumption. Stronger habit is associated with higher evasion in our model, for it generates a negative internality on myopic taxpayers: higher past consumption outcomes reduce present utility. To overcome this internality, taxpayers must gamble (evade) more. Conversely, Bernasconi et al. …nd that stronger self comparison improves tax compliance.
The paper proceeds as follows: section 2 develops a formal model of tax evasion on a social network. Section 3 analyses the predictions of the model -using both formal and simulation methods -for optimal evasion, and for understanding the e¤ects of tax audits. Section 4 concludes. All proofs are in the Appendix. 4 Our model can readily allow the inclusion of a cost due to social stigma. To understand the marginal e¤ect of allowing for social comparison on a network, however, we omit such a cost in what follows.
Model
Let N be a set of taxpayers of size N . A taxpayer i 2 N has an (exogenously earned) income W i > 0. If a taxpayer were to pay income tax on their gross income W i , they would receive a net disposable income X i X i (W i ). As W i enters the model only through X i , we shall typically treat X i as a primitive. Taxpayers can, however, choose to evade an amount of tax
Taxpayer i is audited with probability p i 2 (0; 1) in each period, where this speci…cation allows that the tax authority may condition its audits upon observable features of the taxpayer. Random auditing is the special case in which p i = p for all i.
Following Yitzhaki (1974) , audited taxpayers face a …ne at rate f > 1 on all undeclared tax.
Taxpayers are assumed to derive utility from their level of consumption, the random variablẽ C it , relative to a reference level R it (the determination of which we shall come to later). As is standard in agent-based modelling, although taxpayers live for multiple periods, each makes a succession of single-period decisions and so is "myopic". In this context, myopic behaviour could be the result of cognitive limitations of the part of taxpayers. Consistent with this notion, and our emphasis on social network, Manski (1991) and McFadden (2006) , each argue that individuals faced with dynamic stochastic decision problems that pose immense computational challenges may instead look to other individuals to infer satisfactory policies. 5
In each period, taxpayers behave as if they maximize expected utility, where utility is denoted by U (:). The expected utility of taxpayer i at time t is therefore given by
(1)
where consumption in the audited state (C a it ) and not-audited states (C n it ) is given by:
An obvious objection to this formulation is that it neglects entirely the possibility of absolute utility. Although an absolute component to utility surely exists, we omit it here for simplicity and emphasis. 6 Optimal evasion in period t is the solution to the problem max E it E (U it ) 5 For a small theoretical literature that assumes far-sighted taxpayers see, e.g., Menoncin (2012, 2013) . 6 In international studies, subjective wellbeing measures typically become uncorrelated with absolute income above a threshold of average national income estimated at $5,000 (in 1995, PPP) by Frey and Stutzer (2002) . Since most citizens of developed countries lie above this threshold, our model may be a reasonable approximation in such cases. subject to the Cournot constraint that reference consumption, R it , is taken as given. The …rst order condition for optimal evasion is therefore given by
Reference consumption
Reference consumption, R it , is a function of self and social comparison. To formalize the notion of social comparison, we assume that a taxpayer's consumption is observed by a nonempty set of taxpayers R it N , a set we term the reference group. A taxpayer, i, is observed if their consumption is seen by at least one other taxpayer, i.e., i 2 [ j2N ni R jt .
We represent the observability of consumption in the form of a directed network (graph),
where a link (edge) from taxpayer (node) i to taxpayer j indicates that i observes j's consumption. Links are permitted to be subjectively weighted, for some members of the reference group may be more focal comparators than are others. The network, which can be allowed to update over time, is represented as an N N (adjacency) matrix, G t , of subjective comparison intensity weights 1 g ijt 0, where g iit = 0. For convenience, when i is outward linked, we shall also normalize the g ijt for each taxpayer to sum to unity: P j2R it g ijt = 1.
Taxpayer i is linked to taxpayer j if g ijt > 0. Accordingly, the reference group of taxpayer i is the set of all taxpayers to whom i is linked:
which there is a path (though not necessarily a direct link) between every pair of taxpayers is said to be connected. The set of connected networks we denote by C. A necessary condition for G t 2 C is that all taxpayers belonging to N are observed.
People predominantly compare with others who are similar to them on prescribed dimensions (McPherson et al., 2001) , perhaps because these comparisons are the most informative (Clark and Senik, 2010). It follows that changes in the psychological weight attached to di¤erent comparator taxpayers in the network may arise, for instance, as a response to recent changes in consumption (perhaps as a consequence of having been audited). A simple way to capture this e¤ect is to suppose the g ijt can evolve as functions of lagged absolute consumption di¤erences, jC i;t 1 C j;t 1 j, so that comparison is more intensive between taxpayers i and j the closer are C i;t 1 and C j;t 1 .
De…ne expected consumption as E(C it ) = X i + [1 pf ]E it . We then write reference con-
is a non-decreasing function and Z it , which drives the evolution of R it , re ‡ects self and social comparsion. Speci…cally we write
where q i;t P j2R it g ijt E(C jt ) is the weighted mean over the reference group of expected consumption (re ‡ecting social comparison) and h it is the "habit" level of consumption (re- ‡ecting self comparison), which re ‡ects positively past consumption levels. Thus, Z it is a sum of a level of consumption re ‡ecting self comparison (weighted by h > 0), and a level of consumption re ‡ecting social comparison (weighted by s > 0). To form reference consumption, we adopt a simple linear speci…cation for R it (:) given by
Under the speci…cation in (4) the reference level adjusts towards Z it in each period, which the strength of this adjustment reguated by the parameter & R . In this sense & R may be interpreted as determining the persistence of shocks to reference consumption). In the special
R it is …xed at its initial value for all t.
Nash Equilibrium
Using (4) in the …rst order condition (3), we now solve for the unique Nash equilibrium of the model. To do this, we …rst de…ne a notion of network centrality due to Bonacich (1987) , which computes the (weighted) discounted sum of paths originating from a taxpayer in the network:
De…nition 1 For a network with (weighted) adjacency matrix G, diagonal matrix and weight vector , the weighted Bonacich centrality vector is given by b(G; ; ) = [I G ] 1 provided that [I G ] 1 is well-de…ned and non-negative.
In De…nition 1, the matrix speci…es discount factors that scale down (geometrically) the relative weight of longer paths, while the vector is a set of weights. In the present context the matrix [I G ] 1 is a form of social comparison multiplier. It measures the way in which actions by one taxpayer feed through into other taxpayers'actions. Ballester et al. (2006) show that [I G ] 1 will be well-de…ned, as required by De…nition 1, when I > (G) , where (G) is the largest absolute value of the eigenvalues of G. Intuitively, this condition is that the magnitude of the local externality that a taxpayer's evasion imparts upon other taxpayers cannot be too large. If local externality e¤ects are too strong then the set of equations that de…ne an interior Nash equilibrium of the model have no solution. In this case, multiple corner equilibria can instead arise (see, e.g., Bramoullé and Kranton, 2007) .
Focusing on the case when local externality e¤ects are not too large, we have the following Proposition:
then there is a unique interior Nash equilibrium, at which the optimal amount of tax evaded is given by
According to Proposition 1, in the case of linear-quadratic utility a taxpayer's optimal evasion corresponds to a Bonacich centrality on the social network M t , weighted to re ‡ect a taxpayers marginal utility of consumption. By this measure, taxpayers that are more central in the social network evade more. 7 The uniqueness of equilibrium evasion follows intuitively from the observation that, under linear-quadratic utility, each taxpayer's best response function is linear in the evasion of every other taxpayer. The social network M t transforms the underlying comparison intensity weights, g ijt , by a factor [1 p i f ][1 p j f ] 1 i > 0 that re ‡ects potential heterogeneity in the probability of audit across taxpayers. It follows that, in the special case that all taxpayers face a common audit probability, i.e., the case of random auditing, no adjustment to the underlying comparison intensity weights is warranted. 7 Our interpretation of the matrix of weights, t , follows from noting that marginal utility in the linearquadratic speci…cation is given by U 0 (z) = b az. Accordingly, the term in braces in the expression for i1t is the marginal utility from ones own legal consumption, X i , relative to a reference level of consumption. The latter utilises the weighted average of legal consumption of the members of the reference group.
In this case, therefore, optimal evasion is a weighted Bonacich centrality measure on the untransformed network G t :
Corollary 1 Under the conditions of Proposition 1 and setting p i = p for all i 2 N , the unique interior Nash equilibrium for evasion is given by
What if utility is not linear-quadratic? For an arbitrary twice-di¤erentiable utility function
we may generalize the model by considering the …rst order linear approximation around a Nash equilibrium to a set of (potentially non-linear) …rst order conditions of the form in (3).
The resulting set of equations are given by
where^ t is again a vector of weights for the di¤erent taxpayers, and J t is a matrix of coe¢ cients measuring how actions interact. By appropriate decomposition of J t , therefore, a solution to the equation system in (5) is a Bonacich centrality measure of the form in De…nition 1.
Analysis
The model of the previous section is su¢ ciently rich that it may be used to address a wide range of questions of interest to academics and practitioners in tax authorities. Here we limit ourselves to a focus on three such questions: …rst, we investigate how changes in the exogenous parameters a¤ect evasion; second, we explore how the various direct and indirect marginal revenue e¤ects that arise from performing one extra audit vary across taxpayers with di¤erent levels of network centrality; and last we consider the dynamic pro…le of behavioral responses to an audit.
To study the questions above requires a controlled environment that, in particular, extracts from the stochastic peterbations of the system owing to tax authority audits. Accordingly, we de…ne the notion of steady state -the state the model enters if the exogenous consumption shocks induced by tax authority auditing are "turned o¤". The proceeding Lemma follows directly from Proposition 1:
Lemma 1 Steady state evasion, E SS , is given by the vector of Bonacich centralities, b(M SS ; ; SS ), where
Comparative statics
Under linear-quadratic utility the model exhibits strategic complementaries in evasion choices:
expected utility is supermodular in cross evasion choices. An advantage of this feature of the model is that we may employ the theory of monotone comparative statics (Edlin and Shannon, 1998; Quah, 2007) to analyze, in a straightforward way, the qualitative (i.e., sign)
implications of changes in the underlying exogenous parameters for an arbitrary social network. 8 According to Lemma 2, the sign of the contemporaneous and lagged components of optimal evasion are related. In particular, if cov(C it ; z) = 0, such that changes in z a¤ect consumption only through induced equilibrium adjustments in evasion, then it is su¢ cient to sign the contemporaneous e¤ect. As noted in part (ii) of the Lemma, when z can also in ‡uence consumption directly, the sign of the full e¤ect can, in general, only be determined when both the direct and indirect e¤ects on consumption go in the same direction. With Lemma 2 in hand we prove the following Proposition:
Proposition 2 Under the conditions of Proposition 1 it holds at an interior Nash equilibrium that:
We begin with the results for the pair of parameters fa; bg belonging to the linear-quadratic utility function. Noting that the coe¢ cient of absolute risk aversion is given by A (z) = a [b az] 1 > 0, increases in a associate with decreased risk aversion, while increases in b associate with increased risk aversion. Consistent with this observation, increases in a cause optimal evasion to increase, while increases in b decrease optimal evasion.
An increase in one's own probability of audit lowers optimal evasion, as does an increase in the audit probability of another taxpayer in the social network. When another taxpayer's audit probability increases they decrease their evasion, thereby decreasing the need for other taxpayers seeking to maintain a given level of relative consumption to do likewise. Albeit with di¤erences in economic interpretation, these results are in line with those of models of tax evasion that introduce social concerns through a social norm for compliance. As is standard, an increase in the …ne on undeclared tax reduces optimal evasion.
The parameter, s , which measures the extent to which taxpayers care about social comparison, is positively associated with evasion. Taxpayers impose a negative externality upon other taxpayers when their expected consumption increases, and the size of this externality is directly regulated by s . The greater the externality, the more evasion is pushed upwards in the struggle among taxpayers to maintain relative consumption. The parameters C i;t 1 and h , which both re ‡ect the role of self comparison, are also positively associated with evasion, but the economic intuition (relative to social comparison) di¤ers. Whereas social comparison generates negative externalities, self comparison generates negative internalities: past consumption outcomes a¤ect negatively the evaluation of current consumption.
To overcome this internality, taxpayers must seek a present consumption level that beats C i;t 1 ,which entails attempting greater evasion. The e¤ects of self and social comparison therefore interact positively: the desire to out-consume one's reference group induces evasion, which then pushes up past consumption (in expectation), causing a further increase in evasion on account of the concern for self comparison.
As noted in the Introduction, our …nding that a greater concern for habit consumption increases optimal evasion is the opposite of the …nding of Bernasconi et al. (2016) , who consider the intertemporal problem facing a far-sighted taxpayer, and in which habit re ‡ects the whole history of consumption. In this framework our intuition above no longer holds, for taxpayers do not generate unforeseen internalities on their future selves when they consume more in the present.
The result for X j in Proposition 2 tells us how a taxpayer's evasion responds to changes in the income of other taxpayers. This cross e¤ect is unambiguously positive, for W j enters optimal evasion only through X j (W j ) and @X j (W j ) =@W j > 0, so sign (@E it =@W j ) = sign (@E it =@X j ). This e¤ect arises as one taxpayer becoming richer implies that, to preserve their level of relative consumption, other taxpayers must evade more. The role of own-income is the only case where Lemma 2 does not apply, for cov(C it ; X i ) and @E it =@X i are of opposite signs. Empirically, evasion and wealth are positively related (Clotfelter, 1983; Baldry, 1987) .
Accordingly, in the simulation analysis we calibrate the model to be consistent with this evidence.
Network Structure and Evasion
Conventionally, the tax compliance literature assumes that a tax authority can condition its audit decisions solely on the income declaration contained within a taxpayer's tax return.
Might tax authorities also observe links in social networks, however? Although surely the full gamut of links cannot be observed, importantly, there exist some individuals -celebrities -for whom it is common knowledge that many people observe them. Also, even for noncelebrities, the idea that tax authorities know at least something about people's associations is becoming more credible with the advent of "big data". The UK tax authority, for instance, uses a system known as "Connect", operational details of which are in the public domain (see, e.g., Baldwin and McKenna, 2014; Rigney, 2016; Suter, 2017) . Connect cross-checks public sector and third-party information, seeking to detect relationships among actors. According to Baldwin and McKenna (2014) , the system produces "spider diagrams"linking individuals to other individuals and to other legal entities such as "property addresses, companies, partnerships and trusts." The IRS is known to have also invested heavily in big data, but has, to date, been much more retiscent in revealing its capabilities.
Accordingly, suppose the tax authority is indeed able to observe some properties of the social network. Is this information of value, in the sense of permitting the construction of measures that correlate with evasion, and how does the strength of these correlations vary with network structure? 
Audit strategy
In this section we investigate -both theoretically and with simulations -the implications of the model for the incorporation of information regarding the social network into tax authority audit selection rules. Conventionally, the literature on optimal auditing assumes that a tax authority can condition its audit decisions solely on the income declaration contained within a taxpayer's tax return. Might, however, tax authorities also observe links in social networks? Although surely the full gamut of links cannot be observed, importantly, there exist some individuals -celebrities -for whom it is common knowledge that many people observe them. Also, even for non-celebrities, the idea that tax authorities know at least something about people's associations is becoming more credible with the advent of "big data". The UK tax authority, for instance, uses a system known as "Connect", operational details of which are in the public domain (see, e.g., Baldwin and McKenna, 2014; Rigney, 2016; Suter, 2017) . Connect cross-checks public sector and third-party information, seeking to detect relationships among actors. According to Baldwin and McKenna (2014) , the system produces "spider diagrams"linking individuals to other individuals and to other legal entities such as "property addresses, companies, partnerships and trusts."The IRS is known to have also invested heavily in big data, but has, to date, been much more retiscent in revealing its capabilities.
Consider a single audit to a taxpayer k that perturbs the steady state of the model. The revenue e¤ects this generates are commonly broken down three ways: the direct e¤ect (D k ) is the tax recovered contemporaneously with the audit that would otherwise have been evaded; Proposition 3 The indirect revenue e¤ects of conducting a single audit that perturbs the steady state of the model satisfy
where M SS ; are de…ned as in Lemma 1, and where SS l is an N 1 vector of weights given by
According to Proposition 3, the relative magnitude of the own indirect e¤ect generated from auditing taxpayers i and j is fully determined by comparison of the i th entry of the vector of Bonacich centralities b(M SS ; ; SS i ) with the j th entry of the vector of Bonacich centralities b(M SS ; ; SS j ). An analogous result holds for the own others e¤ect, except that one must compare the sum of the remaining entries of b(M SS ; ; SS i ) with the sum of the remaining entries in b(M SS ; ; SS j ). As an immediate corollary of Proposition 3 the relative sizes of the aggregate indirect e¤ect from auditing distinct taxpayers fi; jg satis…es
Dynamic responses to audit
There is growing interest in understanding behavioral responses to audit, both from theoretical (Bernasconi et al., 2014) and empirical (Gemmell and Ratto, 2012; DeBacker et al., 2015 DeBacker et al., , 2017 Advani et al., 2016; Mazzolini et al., 2017) standpoints. These studies …nd that audits have persistent e¤ects on subsequent compliance behavior, with an e¤ect still discernible four or more years after the initiation of an audit. Typically, these studies emphasize the role of taxpayer learning (about the probability of audit and the e¤ectiveness of the audit process in detecting noncompliance) in accounting for this phenomenon, while Dubin (2007) notes that it could be due to the delayed audit cycle (the audit itself may not conclude for several years, and taxpayers might rationally alter their reporting behavior while an audit is in progress).
In our model the objective audit probability is known (ruling out learning) and audits are instantaneous (ruling out audit cycle e¤ects). In this context it is interesting that, under empirically plausible assumptions concerning the evolution of habit consumption, our model predicts a persistent behavioral e¤ect from an audit, albeit the e¤ect does disappear eventually (i.e., there is no permanent e¤ect). In this sense, we highlight the role of self comparison as an additional explanatory factor (to those so far considered in the literature) in accounting for post-audit compliance behavior.
The best empirical evidence on habit e¤ects is from the behavioral economics literature on 
Conclusion
Tax evasion is estimated to cost governments of developed countries up to 20 percent of income tax revenues. We link the tax evasion decision with a large literature on the role in individual decision-making of self and social comparison. In our model, taxpayers compare their consumption with others in their social network, and also to their own consumption in the recent past. Unlike earlier models that allow only for social comparisons at the aggregate level, each taxpayer makes "local"comparisons on their part of the social network.
Engaging in tax evasion is a tool by which taxpayers can seek to raise their consumption relative to others, and to their own prior consumption. In this setting, we show that a linearquadratic speci…cation of utility yields a unique solution for optimal evasion corresponding to a weighted Bonacich centrality measure on a social network: by this measure, taxpayers that are more central in the social network evade more.
Our model provides a rich framework for understanding how a variety of variables, some under the control of the tax authority, will in ‡uence evasion behavior. Although optimal evasion depends in quite a complex way on the underlying parameters, we are able in many cases to sign unambiguously its comparative statics. We also simulated the model to investigate its implications for audit policy and for the dynamics of behavioral responses to tax authority audits. Our results show that there are objective grounds for tax authorities to target taxpayers who are central in the network. In particular, the revenue raised from other taxpayers following an audit displays increasing returns as a function of network centrality.
We also show how the lagged adjustment of habit consumption can lead tax authority audits to have a relatively persistent e¤ect on evasion behavior, which does not return to baseline until around …ve years after the audit has taken place.
We …nish with some possible avenues for future research. First, the comparative statics exercises we have performed are by no means exhaustive: it would, for instance, also be of interest to investigate systematically the e¤ects of adding or removing links within the social network. Second, while we have focused on tax evasion, it seems possible to extend the model to consider tax avoidance behavior, or indeed criminal activity more generally.
While these extensions must await a dedicated treatment, we hope our contribution at least clari…es the role of self and social comparison in driving tax evasion behavior on a social network.
Proof of Proposition 1. Under linear-quadratic utility equation (3) can be solved to give optimal evasion at an interior solution as
where i > 0 is de…ned in the Proposition. Given that marginal utility, b a [X i R it ], is positive by the assumed restrictions on a, the expression for optimal evasion in (A.1) satis…es
:
Using (4), and noting that
Then the set of N equations de…ned by (A.3) for taxpayers i 2 N can be written in matrix form as E t = t + M t A t where the elements of f t ; ; M t g are as in Proposition 1. It follows that [I M t ] E t = t , so E t = [I M t ] 1 t b(M t ; ; t ). Proof of Lemma 2. Evasion at t + v (v > 0) can be written as E i;t+v = i + i R i;t+v , where f i ; i g are positive constants, the identities of which may be inferred from (A.1). By the linearity of R (:) we may write R i;t+v = R it + h @h i;t+v =@z + s @q i;t+v =@z. It follows that E i;t+v = i + i R it + h @h i;t+v @z + s @q i;t+v @z ;
= E it + i h @h i;t+v @z + s @q i;t+v @z : (A.4)
Hence E i;t+v E it = i [ h @h i;t+v =@z+ s @q i;t+v =@z]. As E i;t+v E it has the sign of @E i;t+v =@z, it follows that the sign of @Ẽ i;t+1 =@z is the sign of i [ h @h i;t+v =@z + s @q i;t+v =@z]. The full adjustment to a new steady state following a change in z at time t is given by lim v!1 E i;t+v E it . Using the chain rule, we may rewrite (A.4) as
@E it @z h @h i;t+v @C it + s @q i;t+v @C it :
Noting that, as no audits are taking place, @C it =@X i = @C n it =@X i = @C it =@E it = @C n it =@E it = 1 this reduces to lim v!1 E i;t+v E it = lim v!1 i @X i @z + @E it @z h @h i;t+v @C it + s @q i;t+v @C it
As @h i;t+v =@C it > 0 and @q i;t+v =@C it > 0 for all v, it follows that, if either @X i =@z = 0 or @X i =@z takes the same sign as @E it =@z, then lim v!1 E i;t+v E it has the sign of @E it =@z. Proof of Proposition 2. We begin by …rst computing the sign of @E it =@z, where z is a placeholder for each variable given in Proposition 2. Observe that E it and E jt (j 6 = i) are complementary actions. We have
With this result we are able to utilize the theory of monotone comparative statics. In particular, we establish globally the sign of the derivative @ 2 E (U it ) = [@E it @z] for each exogenous variable z. It then follows, given our restriction to strongly connected networks, that if @ 2 E (U it ) = [@E it @z] 0 for all i, with @ 2 E (U it ) = [@E it @z] > 0 for at least one such i, then @E it =@z > 0, and if @ 2 E (U it ) = [@E it @z] 0 for all i, with @ 2 E (U it ) = [@E it @z] < 0 for at least one such i, then @E it =@z < 0. Di¤erentiating in (1) we obtain @ 2 E (U it ) @E it @b = 1 p i f > 0;
The exception is the exogenous variable a, for which we show that @ 2 E (U it ) = [@E it @a] is signed locally to an interior equilibrium. Under a set of regularity conditions -that utility is C 2 and concave, U (:) > 0 for positive values of the argument, and that the problem has a unique solution that obeys the …rst order conditions and varies smoothly with the variable of interest (a here) - Quah (2007, p. 420) shows that signing @ 2 E (U it ) = [@E it @a] local to the (unique) interior maximum is su¢ cient to determine the equilibrium sign of @E it =@a. As these regularity conditions hold in the current context, we utilize this approach to establish the equilibrium sign of @E it =@a. We obtain
